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Abstract. Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the
associated certification system, which includes the certification authority (CA) and its behaviour.
However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various
forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We
provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems (ASICS).
We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE
adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model
family we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve
security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide
range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV
protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.
Keywords: authenticated key exchange (AKE), unknown key share (UKS) attacks, certification
authority (CA), invalid public keys, PKI
1 Introduction
After public key encryption and digital signatures, authenticated key establishment (AKE) is perhaps the
most important public key primitive. From a real-world perspective, AKE protocols relying on public
key techniques are widely deployed in systems that are used every day by billions of users, including
systems such as TLS, IPsec, SSH, and various single sign-on systems. From a theoretical perspective,
formal, cryptographically sound modelling for AKE protocols began in the symmetric setting with the
seminal work of Bellare and Rogaway [5], and was later extended to the public key setting [7]. Since then,
there has been a large body of work in this tradition, and many additions and modifications have been
proposed. The most prominent current models in this tradition [4, 13, 29, 41] strengthen or add to the
required security properties, cover different protocol classes, and strengthen adversary powers.
Despite intensive study over two decades, important elements of AKE protocols have not been
sufficiently modelled, preventing our deeper understanding of this important primitive and limiting its
applicability to real-world protocols. Specifically, the public key infrastructure (PKI) needed to support the
authenticity of public keys in AKE, and the interactions between the certification authority (CA), honest
parties, and the adversary, are rarely modelled. Rather, with exceptions as noted below, in typical AKE
models and proofs it is assumed that all public keys are honestly generated and authentically distributed
at the start of the security game, and that there is a single key per party; certificates are excluded from
the model. The adversary can corrupt parties, learning all their secrets, but has limited ability to register
malicious keys. Roughly speaking, this modelling approach corresponds to an ideal CA, who zealously
generates perfect key pairs and securely distributes them to the correct parties.
However, CAs in the real world simply do not operate in such rigorous ways. They have differing
strengths of procedures for checking claimed identities4, so malicious parties might in some cases get
arbitrary public keys certified against identifiers of their choice. The most egregious examples involve CAs
who, either willingly, under coercion, or as a result of security compromises, have issued certificates for
keys and identifiers that they should not have.5 CAs following best-practices may require that a user
4 For example, issuance of Extended Validation (EV) certificates requires stronger identity-checking requirements
than non-EV certificates, see https://www.cabforum.org/certificates.html for more details.
5 In June and July 2011, Dutch CA DigiNotar was hacked [20], with the intruder taking control of all 8 of the CA’s
signing servers; at least 531 rogue certificates were then issued. In August 2011, TURKTRUST CA [18] issued
requesting a certificate submit a certificate signing request (CSR, as per [43]) to the CA. This involves
the user self-signing the data that is to be certified. Other approaches to providing proofs of possession
are standardised in [1, 2, 38]. However, even these basic tests of private key ownership are not mentioned
in industry guidelines issued by the CA/Browser Forum [11,12]. Furthermore, these procedures all fall
short of the proofs of knowledge [37] required to match what is assumed in typical AKE models. Thus,
an attacker may be able to register another party’s public key under his own identifier, or register a
malformed key which then interacts with properly generated keys in an unfortunate way.
Critically, there are realistic attacks on AKE protocols which cannot be captured by AKE security
models that omit CA and PKI aspects:
– Kaliski’s unknown key share (UKS) attack [25] on early versions of MQV exploits the ability of the
adversary to dynamically register a public key (which is valid and for which the adversary does know
the secret key).
– The UKS attack on KEA described by Lauter and Mityagin [30, p. 380] exploits the fact that the
adversary is able to re-register some party’s static public key as his own public key.
– Blake-Wilson and Menezes [9] introduced the duplicate-signature key selection (DSKS) attack on
signature schemes: after observing a user’s signature σ on a message m, the adversary E is able to
compute a signature key pair (skE , vkE) (or sometimes just a verification key vkE) such that σ is
also E’s signature on the message m. Now, for example, if the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol is
implemented using a signature scheme that is vulnerable to DSKS attacks, and the adversary can
register arbitrary public keys with the CA, then the protocol is vulnerable to an online UKS attack [9].
– In Lim and Lee small subgroup attacks [31], the adversary extracts partial (or even complete)
information about a party’s long-term secret key. Some of these attacks require registering invalid
public keys with the CA before engaging in protocol runs with honest participants. Of particular note
are the Lim–Lee-style attacks of Menezes and Ustaoglu [34] on the HMQV protocol [27].
We claim that to date there has been no systematic treatment in the literature of the behaviour of CAs
with respect to public keys and identifiers chosen by the adversary and, relatedly, the treatment of public
keys and ephemeral values by protocol participants (especially with respect to group membership testing).
Our paper sets out to rectify this situation, providing a comprehensive and self-contained treatment of
these features, as well as establishing generic results to make protocols resilient against such attacks.
Contributions. Our paper has three main contributions.
First, we present in Section 2 a framework for reasoning about the security of AKE protocols with
respect to various CA key registration procedures. This framework allows us to capture several attacks
based on adversarial key registration, including UKS attacks, small-subgroup attacks, attacks that occur
when the CA does not check if public keys are registered twice, and attacks that occur when multiple
public keys can be registered per identifier.
Second, we provide in Section 3 a generic approach to achieve strong security guarantees against
adversaries that can register arbitrary public keys for certain types of protocols. In particular, we show
how to transform Diffie–Hellman type AKE protocols that are secure in a model where only honest key
registration is allowed into protocols that are secure even when adversaries can register arbitrary valid or
invalid public keys. In such cases, security is still guaranteed for all sessions (that were considered clean
or fresh in the base model) except those in which the peer’s public key is valid but registered by the
adversary.
Third, we demonstrate in Section 4 how our methodology can be used to establish strong security
guarantees, even when the adversary can register arbitrary public keys, for concrete protocols such as
CMQV, NAXOS, and UP, using CMQV as a running example. We provide in Section 5 recommendations
for the design of protocols that are secure in our models.
Related work. The original computational model for key exchange of Bellare and Rogaway [5] has a long-
lived key generator, which is used to initialise all parties’ keys at the start of the game. This is a standard
part of most computational models today. However, in common with several later models [13, 24, 28], the
adversary cannot influence long-term keys: only honestly generated keys are considered. Starting with
the 1995 model of Bellare and Rogaway [6] it was recognised that the adversary may be able to choose
long-term keys for certain parties, whether public keys or symmetric keys. It is possible to identify three
different methods that have been used to model such an adversary capability.
special certificates with wildcard signing capabilities, allowing impersonation of any domain in the Internet.
This was discovered, by coincidence, only 18 months later.
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1. The adversary can replace long-term keys by providing them as an input to a corrupt query. This was
the method used originally by Bellare and Rogaway [6] and was subsequently used in the public key
setting by others [8, 35].
2. The adversary is allowed to generate arbitrary keys for corrupted parties at any time during the
protocol run [27].
3. An additional query is added specifically to set up a user with a new key chosen by the adversary
[15, 22, 44]. This query is typically called establishparty and takes as input the user name and its
long-term public key.
These methods allow the models to capture the Kaliski attack [25], which requires the adversary to register
a new public key after certain protocol messages have been obtained. However, none of these currently
used methods has the generality of our model and, in particular, all of them omit the following realistic
features:
– registration of multiple public keys per user;
– flexible checking by certification authorities via a verification procedure;
– adversarial choice of public keys per session.
Special mention should also be made of the model of Shoup [41]. Unlike most popular AKE models today,
it uses a simulatability definition of security comparing ideal and real world views. Security is defined to
mean that for any real world adversary there is an ideal world adversary (benign by definition) such that
the transcripts of the two are computationally indistinguishable. Real-world adversaries have the ability to
assign users to public key certificates. Shoup’s model has not been widely used and the examples in [41]
are not fully worked through. Furthermore, the model cannot represent an adversary who obtains only
ephemeral secret keys without knowing the long-term key of the same user and therefore cannot capture
security properties common in more modern models.
Cash et al. [14] and Hofheinz et al. [21] have considered the security of non-interactive key exchange
(NIKE) in settings where the adversary can register arbitrary public keys, analogously to our ASICS
setting for interactive key exchange. It is an interesting open problem to examine how the security models
and constructions for NIKE in [14,21] can be built upon to achieve security in the ASICS setting.
Boldyreva et al. [10] model certification and PKI for public key encryption and signatures. They point
to legitimate concerns regarding what certification authorities can be expected to check in practice. It
is interesting to note that while they use key exchange as a prime motivating example for modelling
certification and there has been some follow-up work [19], key exchange is not explored in their models.
Nevertheless, [10,19] are in the spirit of our work: like ours, their models allow (amongst other things)
corrupt key registration. However, they do not allow the adversary to reveal long-term or ephemeral keys,
which is fundamental to modern AKE security models.
Critically, all of the approaches mentioned above have only been used to establish results for a handful of
specific protocols. In contrast, we establish generic results that facilitate the design and verification of
AKE protocols, and that can be applied to a large class of protocols.
2 ASICS model family
In this section we define a parameterized AKE security model that allows for explicit modelling of the
certification of public keys. Prominent AKE security frameworks can be instantiated in this family of
models, as well as extensions that allow dynamic adversarial registration of arbitrary bitstrings as public
keys.
Generally speaking, from a user’s point of view, participation in key exchange encompasses three
consecutive phases: First, users set up their individual key pairs; more precisely, each user invokes a
randomized algorithm KeyGen that outputs a fresh secret-key/public-key pair (sk, pk). Second, users
contact a certification authority (CA) to get their keys certified: each user provides the CA with its
identifier Pˆ and its public key pk, and obtains a certificate C that binds the identifier to the key. After
completing these setup steps, in the third phase, users can engage in interactive sessions with other users
to establish shared keys. To do so, they usually require knowledge of their own key pair (sk, pk), their
identifier Pˆ , and the corresponding certificate C. In addition to that, protocols may require a priori
knowledge of (a subset of) the peer’s public key pk′, peer’s identifier Qˆ, and peer’s certificate C ′. As we
will see, our execution model is general enough to cover all these settings.
To ease notation, we assume that public key pk and identifier Pˆ can be readily derived from any
certificate C; we use notation C.pk = pk and C.id = Pˆ correspondingly. This assumption holds for all
practical PKIs we are aware of, and in particular for X.509 certificates (as used in SSL/TLS); the latter
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carry public key and identifier in a canonically formatted data structure. In potential other cases, where
keys and identifiers cannot be extracted from certificates but instead are auxiliary input to the verification
routine, certificates can still be expected to be valid for only a single key/identifier pair, i.e., the mapping
from C to compatible pk and Pˆ is again unambiguous. Proposed notations C.pk and C.id are hence
meaningful also in such cases.
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the interaction between users and the CA that occurs in
the certification process. We consider different degrees of rigour in the checks of consistency and ownership
of public keys pk presented to the CA. On the one hand, CAs could be pedantic with such verifications
(e.g., require a proof of knowledge6 of the secret key corresponding to pk); on the other hand, CAs could
also just accept any given bitstring pk as valid and issue a certificate on it. The ability to precisely assess
the security of key establishment in the face of different CA behaviours is a key contribution of our new
model family.
Definition 1. An ASICS protocol Π consists of a set of domain parameters, a key generation algorithm
KeyGen, a public key verification procedure VP, and the protocol description pi that describes how key
exchange protocol messages are generated and responded to as well as how the session key is derived.
We denote by VP the specific verification procedure on public keys and identifiers that a considered CA
deploys. As different checks on pk and Pˆ might require different levels of interaction between the registering
user and the CA, we model it as a procedure, as opposed to a function. We require that VP is efficient
and has binary output. Furthermore, we require that the CA issues the requested certificate only if VP
outputs value 1; all certification requests where VP outputs value 0 are rejected. Note that, for simplicity,
we only consider non-interactive verification procedures (i.e., two-message registration protocols) between
the user and the CA. A more general treatment covering interactive verification procedures as well would
introduce additional complexities to our framework.
Specific key exchange protocols might be insecure for one (liberal) instantiation of VP, and be secure
for another (stricter) one. Note that CAs that do not perform any check on pk and Pˆ are modelled by a
verification procedure VP that always outputs 1. A verification procedure that performs few checks may
output 1 for at least all pk ∈ PK, where PK denotes the set of possible public keys output by KeyGen.
Precisely, if the inputs of algorithm KeyGen are security parameter 1k and randomness r ∈R {0, 1}k, then
we define
PK =
{
pk | there exists r ∈ {0, 1}k such that KeyGen(1k; r) = ( · , pk)} .
A verification procedure with high assurance may require a zero-knowledge argument that the requester
knows the secret key corresponding to the public key, and even that the key was generated verifiable at
random. Note that we allow VP to keep an internal state between invocations; our model hence covers
possible implementations of CAs that reject certification requests with public keys that have already been
registered (e.g., for a different identifier).
2.1 Security model
At a high level, our model stipulates users that generate one or more keys, obtain certificates for these
keys from a CA, and use keys and certificates to run (potentially concurrent) sessions of the key agreement
protocol. Similar to other security models [5, 13], the adversary controls all communication in these
sessions, corrupts users at will to obtain their secret keys, and arbitrarily reveals established session keys.
Innovative is the adversary’s additional ability to steer the registration process with the CA: it can obtain
from the CA valid certificates for public keys and identifiers of its choosing (as long as VP evaluates to 1),
and provides users with such certificates.
To keep our model simple and comprehensible, we abstract away any forgeability issues of certificates
and assume the following ideal functionality: no certificate will be considered valid unless it has been
issued by the CA. We model this by letting the challenger keep a list C of all CA-issued certificates and by
equipping users with a certificate verification oracle OCV that checks membership in that list; concretely,
we assume that OCV (C) = 1⇔ C ∈ C. Of course, in concrete implementations, this oracle is replaced by
an explicit local verification routine; for instance, if certification is implemented via a signature scheme,
this will include its verification procedure (besides further checking of validity, chain-validity, revocation
state, etc.).
6 Although interactive or non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems seem to yield ideal solutions in this context,
standards like X.509, OpenPGP, and PKCS#10 content themselves with the purely heuristic (and inferior)
approach of demanding a so-called proof-of-possession (PoP), mostly implemented via self-signed certificates or
self-signed certificate requests (cf. [1,38,39]). The security of such constructions seems to be difficult to formally
assess [37].
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Sessions and session state. Users, once they have created their keys and obtained corresponding
certificates, can execute protocol sessions. Within a user, each such session is uniquely identified by a
pair s = (C, i), where C denotes the certificate used by the user (by himself) in that session, and i is a
counter. The user maintains session-specific variables as indicated in Table 1. Some session variables are
fixed upon session creation, whereas others can be assigned or updated during protocol execution. Some,
such as pcert, status, and key, are considered to be outputs of the key establishment and might be used
in higher-level protocols or applications. A session s has accepted if sstatus = accepted.
acert certificate of the actor (the user running this session)
pcert certificate of this session’s peer
role taken role; either I (initiator) or R (responder)
sent concatenation of all messages sent in this session
rcvd concatenation of all messages received in this session
status session status; either active, accepted, or rejected
key key in {0, 1}k established in this session
rand randomness used in this session
data any additional protocol-specific data
Table 1. Elements of session state
QN = {kgen, hregister, create, send} (Normal protocol behaviour)
QS = {corrupt, randomness, session-key} (corruption of Secrets)
QR = {pkregister, npkregister} (adversarial key Registration)
Table 2. Overview of query sets. Additionally, there is a test-session query.
Adversarial queries. The adversary interacts with users by issuing queries. The adversary can direct
users to establish long-term key pairs and certificates (kgen, hregister), to initiate protocol sessions (create),
and to respond to protocol messages (send). The adversary may be able to learn long-term keys (corrupt),
session-specific randomness (randomness), or session keys (session-key) from users. The adversary can also
maliciously obtain certificates from the CA (pkregister, npkregister).
The queries in set QN = {kgen, hregister, create, send}, defined as follows, model normal operation of
the protocol; they are required in any security model. Initially, the auxiliary variables HK, C, Ch, Cpk, and
Cnpk are set to ∅.
– kgen () By running algorithm KeyGen, a fresh key pair (sk, pk) is generated. Public key pk is returned
to the adversary; secret key sk is stored for processing potential later queries corresponding to pk. The
public key is added to the set of honestly generated keys: HK ← HK ∪ {pk}.
– hregister(pk, Pˆ ) The query requires that pk ∈ HK and that VP outputs 1 on input pk7 and Pˆ ;
otherwise, it returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA for the identifier Pˆ . The resulting
certificate C is added to the global set of certificates and to the set of honestly generated certificates:
C ← C ∪ {C} and Ch ← Ch ∪ {C}. The query returns C.
– create (s = (C, i) , r, [C ′]) The query requires that C ∈ Ch, that a session with counter i for certificate
C does not already exist, and that r ∈ {I,R}; otherwise, it returns ⊥. A new session s is created for
the user with public key C.pk and identifier C.id. Session variables are initialized as
(sacert, spcert, srole, ssent, srcvd, sstatus, skey)← (C,⊥, r, , , active,⊥) .
If the optional certificate C ′ is provided, we set spcert ← C ′. In addition, a string in {0, 1}k is sampled
uniformly at random and assigned to srand; we assume that all randomness required during the execution
of session s is deterministically derived from srand. The user also runs the initialization procedure for
the key exchange protocol, which may further initialize its own (internal) state variable sdata and
optionally generate a message M . If M was generated, set ssent ← M , and return M . Otherwise,
return ⊥.
7 Reasonable implementations of VP output 1 on all keys pk ∈ HK, because HK ⊆ PK.
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– send (s,M) The query requires that session s exists and that sstatus = active; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
The user continues the protocol execution for this session with incoming message M , which may
optionally generate a response message M ′. Next, srcvd is set to (srcvd ‖ M) and, if M ′ is output,
ssent is set to (ssent ‖ M ′). The protocol execution may (re-)assign values to sstatus and skey, and
to the session’s internal state variable sdata. Also, if the value spcert was not provided to the create
query, then protocol execution may assign a value to spcert. (For example, in TLS the client does not
learn the server’s certificate until it receives the ServerCertificate message.) If M ′ was generated,
return M ′; otherwise return ⊥.
Remark 1 (Multiple CAs). Our model stipulates a PKI with a single CA. This could be considered a
limitation for the analysis of many practically relevant scenarios. For example, the PKI currently in place
to secure web traffic in the Internet consists of a large number of independently acting CAs. However,
our single-CA setting can readily emulate a multi-CA setting: If VP1, . . . ,VPn denote the verification
procedures of n independent CAs, then composed verification procedure VP1...n that outputs 1 if there
exists at least one i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that VPi outputs 1, effectively folds the n CAs into a single one,
adequately modeling the aforementioned multi-CA setting.
Remark 2 (One key for many identifiers). A frequently observed setting in the web PKI is that users hold
one public key that they bind to a set of identifiers (with the corresponding number of certificates). This
happens, for instance, if globally acting companies register domain names in several different countries,
but process HTTPS requests on a single centralized facility. Observe that our model covers such cases of
multiple registration of a key: hregister may be queried many times for the same pk. Moreover, through
being identified by pairs (C, i) (as opposed to (pk, i)), sessions associated with one pk are aware of the
identifier C.id in use.
The queries in set QS = {corrupt, randomness, session-key} model the corruption of a user’s secrets. Similar
queries are found in other standard AKE models [5, 13].
– corrupt (pk) The query requires pk ∈ HK; otherwise, it returns ⊥. This query returns the secret
key sk corresponding to public key pk.
– randomness (s) The query requires that session s exist; otherwise, it returns ⊥. The query returns
the randomness srand.
– session-key (s) The query requires that session s exist and that sstatus = accepted; otherwise, it
returns ⊥. The query returns the session key skey.
Remark 3 (Semantics of randomness query). The randomness query gives the adversary access to the
randomness srand that is used in a particular session. Formally, one may think of the session as an instance
of a probabilistic Turing machine: the query gives the adversary the values that are read from the random
tape. Practically, this models a randomness generator whose values are revealed after they are produced,
for example, by a side-channel attack. This is similar to the ephemeral key reveal query from [29].
The hregister query introduced above only allows registration of keys pk ∈ HK, i.e., keys held by honest
users. In contrast, the adversary can obtain certificates on arbitrary (valid) public keys using the following
pkregister query. Going even further, the npkregister query allows registration of objects that are not
even public keys (always assuming that VP outputs 1 on the candidate object). These queries will allow
modelling Kaliski’s attack on MQV [25] and small subgroup attacks [31], amongst others. We emphasize
that the queries in set QR = {pkregister, npkregister} have no counterparts in standard definitions of key
exchange security.
– pkregister(pk, Pˆ ) The query requires that pk ∈ PK and that VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ ;
otherwise, it returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA for identifier Pˆ . The resulting
certificate C is added to the global set of certificates and to the set of certificates generated through
pkregister query: C ← C ∪ {C} and Cpk ← Cpk ∪ {C}. The query returns C.
– npkregister(pk, Pˆ ) The query requires that pk 6∈ PK and that VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ ;
otherwise, it returns ⊥. The public key pk is registered at the CA for the identifier Pˆ . The resulting
certificate C is added to the global set of certificates and to the set of certificates generated through
npkregister query: C ← C ∪ {C} and Cnpk ← Cnpk ∪ {C}. The query returns C.
Remark 4 (Efficiency of pkregister and npkregister processing). Observe that pkregister and npkregister
queries require a membership test for set PK. In some settings, such tests might correspond to computa-
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tionally hard problems like quadratic residuosity or DDH8. Although we stress that the named queries
and the ensuing security experiments are well-defined nevertheless, we discuss two possible problems that
might arise when analyzing key exchange protocols where PK-membership is difficult to assess: (1) If the
queries, by whatever means, correctly decide membership in PK, then the adversary implicitly gets access
to a decision oracle for that set; this has to be taken into account in corresponding security reductions,
e.g., when selecting appropriate hardness assumptions. (2) If an analyzed ASICS protocol Π is used as
a component in a higher-level construction Π ′, then any security argument that reduces the security
of Π ′ to the security of Π will inevitably have to specify how pkregister and npkregister oracles are to be
simulated. As mentioned before, in some settings this seems to be infeasible.
2.2 Security experiment
Using the above queries, we define a parameterized family of AKE security models. As is common in
BR-style AKE models, we must restrict query usage so that the adversary cannot trivially win the security
experiment. The conditions under which queries are disallowed are expressed by a freshness condition,
which typically uses a matching condition to formalize intended partner sessions.
Definition 2 (Matching, freshness, ASICS model). Let Π be an ASICS protocol. A matching
condition M for Π is an efficient binary relation on the set of sessions of Π. Let Q be a set of queries
such that QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪QS ∪QR. A freshness condition F for (Π,Q) is an efficient predicate (usually
depending on a matching condition M) that takes a session of Π and a sequence of queries (including
arguments and results) of a security experiment over queries in Q. We call X = (M,Q,F ) an ASICS
model for Π.
Definition 3 gives two possible matching conditions. We will later give examples of freshness conditions, in
Example 1 on the following page and in Section 4.1.
We refer to [16] for more details on the intricacies of matching definitions in AKE protocols. Two
issues are important here. First, there is a strong connection between the information used in a matching
definition and the information used to compute the session key. Second, some protocols like the two-message
versions of MQV and HMQV allow sessions to compute the same key even if they perform the same
role, whereas other protocols such as NAXOS require the sessions that compute the same key to perform
different roles. In the remainder of the paper we will use one of the definitions below, depending on the
type of protocol.
Definition 3 (M1-matching, M2-matching). Let s and s′ denote two sessions of an ASICS protocol.
We say that session s′ M1-matches (or is M1-matching) session s if sstatus = s′status = accepted and
(sacert.pk, sacert.id, spcert.pk, spcert.id, ssent, srcvd)
= (s′pcert.pk, s
′
pcert.id, s
′
acert.pk, s
′
acert.id, s
′
rcvd, s
′
sent)
Similarly, we say that session s′ M2-matches (or is M2-matching) session s if s′ M1-matches session s
and srole 6= s′role.
Thus, we will use M1 for protocols such as the two-message versions of MQV and HMQV, and we will use
M2 for protocols such as NAXOS [16].
Remark 5 (Comparison to matching definition if only one key per identifier is allowed). Note that when
users are allowed to have multiple public keys, matching sessions (that is, intended communication partners)
of some AKE protocol pi do not always compute the same session key if the definition of “matching” does
not require agreement on the public keys used in the respective sessions.
The goal of the adversary is to distinguish the session key of a fresh session from a completely random
string. This is modelled through an additional query:
– test-session (s) This query requires that session s exists and that sstatus = accepted; otherwise, it
returns ⊥. A bit b is chosen at random. If b = 1, then skey is returned. If b = 0, a random element of
{0, 1}k is returned.
8 For instance, consider an RSA modulus N and the (cyclic) group QRN of quadratic residues modulo N . As the
CDH problem in QRN is provably as hard as factoring N [32,40], it is conceivable to instantiate a DL-based key
agreement protocol (like UM, HMQV, etc.) with that group. This would result in PK = QRN , and pkregister
and npkregister queries would have to perform membership tests for this set. However, the latter is assumed to
be a hard problem, by the quadratic residuosity assumption [23].
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Definition 4 (ASICSX experiment). Let Π be an ASICS protocol and X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS
model. We define experiment ASICSX , between an adversary E and a challenger who implements all users
and the CA, as follows:
1. The experiment is initialized with domain parameters for security parameter k.
2. The adversary E can perform any sequence of queries from Q.
3. At some point in the experiment, E issues a test-session query for a session s that has accepted and
satisfies F at the time the query is issued.
4. The adversary may continue with queries from Q, under the condition that the test session must
continue to satisfy F .
5. Finally, E outputs a bit b′ as E’s guess for b.
Definition 5 (ASICSX advantage). The adversary E wins the security experiment if it correctly outputs
the bit b chosen in the test-session query. The ASICSX -advantage of E is defined as Adv
ASICSX
Π,E (k) =
|2 Pr(b = b′)− 1|.
Definition 6 (ASICS security). Let Π be an ASICS protocol and X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS model.
Π is said to be secure in ASICS model X if, for all PPT adversaries E, it holds that
1. if two users successfully accept in M -matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key,
and
2. E has no more than a negligible advantage in winning the ASICSX experiment; that is, there exists a
negligible function negl in the security parameter k such that AdvASICSXΠ,E (k) ≤ negl(k).
Remark 6 (Implicit authentication). Note that the ASICS security definition, like eCK-style security
definitions, only provides implicit peer authentication, meaning that the key could only be known by the
peer, not explicit authentication that the peer actually was active in the session.
Remark 7 (Comparison to other models, including BR, CK and eCK). By choosing the appropriate query
subset, freshness, and matching definitions, our parameterised model can be instantiated to produce many
existing AKE models. The vast majority of existing models assume honestly-generated key pairs that
are securely distributed to users. They therefore do not have queries to model pkregister and npkregister.
Our model family includes the models eCK [29] and eCKw [17], which capture the leakage of session
specific ephemeral data, as well as the eCK-PFS model [17] incorporating perfect forward secrecy. The
Bellare-Rogaway model [5] can be captured in our approach by including timestamps as part of the
messages, to accurately model the matching definition from [5]. Unlike the CK model [13], we do not
assume unique session identifiers to be available to the protocol up-front. We do not consider this a
drawback as real-world protocols may not have such identifiers either. Instead, our family includes the
basic CKHMQV model [27] in which the HMQV protocol was analysed. For the CK and CKHMQV models
we have chosen to interpret the session-state as the generated randomness, in the same fashion as the
models have been used by their authors [13,27].
Remark 8 (Freshness will depend on the set of allowed queries and on the matching definition). Note that
the exact definition of freshness F used in a security model X will likely depend heavily on the set of
queries Q available to the adversary in that model, as well as the specific matching definition. For example,
when Q includes pkregister and/or npkregister queries, then we will require an additional restriction on
the registration status of the specific public key of the peer used in the test session.
Example 1. Let us consider the following ASICS model as a concrete example. Let X = (M1, Q, F ) be
the ASICS model given by Q = QN ∪ {session-key} ∪ QR and F defined as follows. Given a sequence of
queries and a session s, F holds if:
– no session-key(s) query has been issued, and
– for all sessions s′ such that s′ M1-matches s, no query session-key(s′) has been issued, and
– no query pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) has been issued.
The model X is an extension of a BR-like model with a CA that allows registration of arbitrary keys. If a
protocol is secure in X, then it is secure even if the adversary can register arbitrary bitstrings as public
keys, as long as the specific peer key used in the test session is not an adversary-generated valid public key.
2.3 Capturing attacks
We illustrate how several attacks exploiting the adversary’s ability to register valid or invalid public keys
can be captured in ASICS models.
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Kaliski’s online UKS attack against MQV [25]. As noted in Example 1, Kaliski’s attack against MQV can
be captured in an ASICS model where the adversary can register a specific valid public key with his own
identifier via a pkregister query. As the adversary knows the secret key corresponding to the registered
public key, the attack cannot be prevented by VP requiring a proof-of-possession of the secret key.
UKS attack against KEA based on public-key re-registration [30, p. 380]. Suppose that public key pk has
been honestly registered at the CA for some user with identifier Pˆ via the query hregister(pk, Pˆ ). In this
UKS attack on the KEA protocol, the adversary re-registers the public key pk under his own identifier
Lˆ 6= Pˆ by issuing the query pkregister(pk, Lˆ). The attack is prevented if VP checks for uniqueness of the
public key and outputs 0 when the public key was certified before (as observed in [30, p. 381]). Note that
the UKS attack can also be prevented by making the session key derivation depend on users’ identifiers.
UKS attack against KEA+ based on impersonation attack. Lauter and Mityagin [30] produced the KEA+
protocol from the KEA protocol and Protocol 4 in [7] by incorporating the identifiers of the user and its peer
in the session key computation to prevent UKS attacks; however, a similar but previously unreported UKS
attack still works on the KEA+ protocol. This UKS attack involves a type of impersonation attack [42, p.
3]: it requires the adversary to successfully impersonate a user to the CA who then issues a certificate
containing the user’s identifier, but the adversary’s valid public key. We stress that the attack does not
arise when only one public key per identifier can be registered.
The UKS attack against KEA+ is captured in the ASICS model X = (M2, Q, F ) given by Q =
QN ∪ {session-key} ∪ {pkregister} and F defined as follows. We say that a session s satisfies F if it holds
that
– no session-key(s) query has been issued, and
– for all sessions s′ such that s′ M2-matches s, no query session-key(s′) has been issued, and
– no query pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) has been issued.
We next show that KEA+ is insecure in ASICS model X. The adversary creates an initiator session via the
query create(s = (C, i), I, C ′), where the public keys C.pk = A = ga and C ′.pk = B = gb were honestly
registered via the query hregister. Let C.id = Aˆ. Now the adversary registers a second public key A′ = Ar,
for some r chosen uniformly at random from Zp, with identifier Aˆ, by issuing the query pkregister(A′, Aˆ)
returning certificate C ′′. He then creates a responder session via the query create(s′ = (C ′, j),R, C ′′) and
activates session s′ by sending the message X = gx sent by session s to session s′. The adversary intercepts
the message Y = gy sent by session s′, modifies it by setting Y ′ = Y r, and then sends message Y ′ to
session s. Session s accepts the key skey = H(Y
′a, Bx, Aˆ, Bˆ) as the session key, while session s′ accepts as
its key s′key = H(A
′y, Xb, Aˆ, Bˆ). The completed session s is chosen as the test session. Now a session-key
query to session s′ reveals the session key of the test session. The sessions s and s′ are not M2-matching
(since srcvd 6= s′sent), but compute the same session key. This leads to our UKS attack. Adding either the
long-term public keys of both actor and peer or the exchanged messages (in addition to the identifiers)
in the session key computation would prevent the attack, since then the session keys computed in both
sessions would be different with overwhelming probability (assuming that H is modelled as a random
oracle). Note that if KCI attacks are permitted in the model, the UKS attack cannot be prevented by VP
requiring a proof-of-possession of the secret key corresponding to the public key A′.
Online UKS attack on STS-MAC based on duplicate-signature key selection (DSKS) [9]. Suppose that
the signature scheme employed in the STS-MAC protocol is vulnerable to DSKS attacks. Note that
resistance to DSKS attacks is not covered by standard security notions for signatures such as EUF-CMA
or SEUF-CMA security, which concern only single keys. The UKS attack on STS-MAC [9, p. 160] exploits
the ability of the adversary to register a valid public key pk under his own identifier during the run
of the protocol. More precisely, the adversary first intercepts a user’s message containing a signature
σ on message m. He then issues a query pkregister(pk, Lˆ) such that σ is also a valid signature on m
under pk. The query associates pk with the adversary’s identifier Lˆ. Since the adversary knows the secret
key corresponding to pk, he obtains a certificate from the CA even if VP requires a proof-of-possession.
Countermeasures to such UKS attacks via modification of the protocol are available [9].
Lim–Lee style attack against HMQV with special domain parameters, without validation of ephemeral
public keys [34]. Suppose that the underlying group G is a subgroup of the group of units U(R) of a ring
R containing an element T 6= 0 such that T 2 = 0. Then, the HMQV protocol is vulnerable to the attack
described in [34, p. 137] with respect to an ASICS model in which the adversary is only given access to
standard protocol execution queries in the set QN . However, as mentioned in [34, p. 134], this attack
on HMQV can only be launched in certain exotic groups that have never been considered for practical
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use. The attack can be eliminated by restricting the group used for analyzing HMQV in some way or by
adding group membership tests on ephemeral public keys to the protocol.
Lim–Lee style attack against HMQV with DSA domain parameters, without validation of ephemeral public
keys [33]. Let G = 〈g〉 denote a q-order subgroup of Z∗p, where q and p are prime and (p− 1)/q is smooth.
The attack on two-pass HMQV [33, p. 5] can be captured in an ASICS model where the adversary is
given access to the queries in the set Q = QN ∪ (QS \ {corrupt}) ∪ (QR \ {pkregister}). In particular,
the adversary can register invalid public keys via the npkregister query. This attack can be prevented by
countermeasures such as requiring VP to include a group membership test on the public key submitted
for certification, or by including group membership tests on both ephemeral and long-term public keys
during protocol execution. Small-subgroup attacks may also exist in other settings, for instance in groups
over elliptic curves.
We revisit some of the previously mentioned attacks in Section 4.2 to illustrate that the modular
approach that we develop in Section 3 cannot be applied to the corresponding protocols.
3 Achieving ASICS security
We provide a modular approach to obtain provable ASICS security for certain types of protocols. We first
show in Theorem 1 how a result from Kudla and Paterson [28, Theorem 2] can be adapted to incorporate
adversarial registration of valid public keys. Then, in Theorem 2, we indicate how to transform protocols
to achieve security in the presence of adversaries that can register arbitrary invalid public keys. We start
by defining an adapted version of strong partnering [28].
Definition 7 (Strong partnering). Let Π be an ASICS protocol, and let X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS
model. We say that Π has strong partnering in the ASICSX experiment if no PPT adversary, when
attacking Π in the ASICSX experiment, can establish two sessions s and s
′ of protocol Π holding the same
session key without being M -matching, with more than negligible probability in the security parameter k.
Given an ASICS model X = (M,Q,F ), we denote by cNR-X (using terminology from [28], where
cNR stands for “computational No-Reveals”, referring to the absence of session-key reveals) the reduced
computational ASICSX experiment which is similar to the ASICSX experiment except that the adversary
(a) is not allowed to issue session-key and test-session queries, (b) must pick a session that has accepted
and satisfies F at the end of its execution, and (c) output the session key for this session. See Kudla and
Paterson [28] for a more detailed description of reduced games.
Definition 8 (cNR-X security). Let Π be an ASICS protocol and X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS model.
Π is said to be cNR-X-secure if, for all PPT adversaries E, it holds that
1. if two users successfully accept in M -matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key,
and
2. E has no more than a negligible advantage in winning the cNR-X experiment; that is, there exists a neg-
ligible function negl in the security parameter k such that AdvcNR-XΠ,E (k) ≤ negl(k), where AdvcNR-XΠ,E (k)
is defined as the probability that E outputs (s, skey) for a session s that has accepted and satisfies F .
Our first theorem deals with the security of DH-type ASICS protocols, which are a generalization of
DH-type AKE protocols of Cremers and Feltz [17] to include certificates and to explicitly identify session
strings. This class of protocols includes the most prominent modern two-message AKE protocols.
Definition 9 (DH-type ASICS protocol). A DH-type ASICS protocol is an ASICS protocol of the
following form, specified by functions fI , fR, FI , FR, H:
– Domain parameters (G, g, q), where G = 〈g〉 is a group of prime order q generated by g.
– KeyGen(): Choose a ∈R [0, q − 1]. Set A← ga. Return secret key sk = a and public key pk = A.
– VP(x, Pˆ ) = 1 for all x and all Pˆ (i.e., the CAs do not perform any checks).
– When the initiator is activated to create a new session s with a create(s = (C, i), r = I, C ′) query,
where the secret key corresponding to C.pk is a, the initiator computes an outgoing ephemeral public
key X ← gfI(srand,a,C,C′) and returns X as an outgoing message.
– The responder is activated to create a new session s′ with a create(s = (C ′, j), r = R, C) query, where
the secret key corresponding to C ′.pk is b.
– When the responder is activated in a session s′ with a send(s′,M = X), the responder computes
an outgoing ephemeral public key Y ← gfR(s′rand,b,C′,C) and returns Y as an outgoing message. The
responder computes a session string (an intermediate value to which we give a special name) ss′ ←
FR(fR(s′rand, b, C
′, C), b,X,C ′, C), a session key s′key ← H(ss′), and accepts: s′status ← accepted.
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– When the initiator is activated in a session s with a send(s,M = Y ), the initiator computes a
session string ss ← FI (fI(srand, a, C,C ′), a, Y, C,C ′), a session key skey ← H(ss), and accepts:
sstatus ← accepted.
Initiator I Responder R
sacert = C, spcert = C
′ s′acert = C
′, s′pcert = C
sk = a, C.pk = ga, C′.pk = B sk = b, C′.pk = gb, C.pk = A
x← fI(srand, a, C,C′)
X ← gx
X
−−−−−−−−→ y ← fR(s′rand, b, C′, C)
Y
←−−−−−−−− Y ← gy
ss← FI (x, a, Y, C,C′) ss′ ← FR (y, b,X,C′, C)
if ss = ⊥ then if ss′ = ⊥ then
sstatus ← rejected s′status ← rejected
else else
skey ← H(ss) s′key ← H(ss′)
sstatus ← accepted s′status ← accepted
Fig. 1. Messages for generic DH-type ASICS protocol
Theorem 1. Let X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS model with QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪QS. Let Y = (M,Q′, F ′) be
the ASICS model where Q′ = Q ∪ {pkregister} and F ′ is defined as follows. A session s is said to satisfy
F ′ if it satisfies F and no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has been issued. Let Π be a DH-type ASICS
protocol. Suppose that
– Π has strong partnering in the ASICSY experiment,
– cNR-X security of the related protocol pi (defined in the same way as Π except that the session key
generated in pi is the session string of Π (i.e., spikey = ss
Π)) is probabilistic polynomial-time reducible
to the hardness of the computational problem of some relation φ,
– the session string decisional problem in the ASICSY experiment for Π is polynomial-time reducible to
the decisional problem of φ, and
– there is a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether an arbitrary bitstring is an element of G,
then the security of Π in ASICS model Y is probabilistic polynomial-time reducible to the hardness of the
gap problem of φ, if H is modelled as a random oracle.
In the cNR-X experiment of Theorem 1 the queries session-key and pkregister are not allowed, whereas
in ASICSY both queries are allowed. Theorem 1 states that for any DH-type protocol Π, under certain
conditions, it holds that security of the related protocol pi in a reduced model (in which public keys can
only be honestly registered) implies security of Π in the stronger non-reduced model that additionally
captures adversarial registration of valid public keys.
The following theorem, which is applicable to a wider range of protocols than Theorem 1 (e.g., to
three-message protocols such as UM [35] or HMQV-C [26]), allows us to achieve security against adversaries
that can obtain certificates from the CA for invalid public keys by transforming the protocol to include a
group membership test on the peer’s public key. In contrast to Theorem 1, no additional requirement is
imposed on the freshness condition of model Y .
Theorem 2. Let X = (M,Q,F ) be an ASICS model with QN ⊆ Q ⊆ QN ∪QS ∪ (QR \ {npkregister}).
Let Π be an ASICS protocol where the domain parameters (G, g, q), the key generation algorithm
KeyGen and the verification procedure VP are as in Definition 9.
Let f(Π) denote the ASICS protocol derived from Π by adding the following protocol step for each role
of the protocol. Upon creation with (or, via send, receipt of) the certificate C ′ to be used for the peer of
session s, the user running session s checks whether the public key C ′.pk belongs to the group G before
continuing the execution of the protocol. In case the check fails, the protocol execution is aborted and
sstatus is set to rejected.
Suppose that protocol Π is secure in ASICS model X and that there is a polynomial-time algorithm
that decides whether an arbitrary bitstring is an element of G. Then the transformed protocol f(Π) is
secure in ASICS model Y = (M,Q ∪ {npkregister}, F ).
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Combining both theorems, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Let Π be a DH-type ASICS protocol. Let X = (M,Q,F ) and Y = (M,Q′, F ′) be defined
as in Theorem 1, and let the conditions of Theorem 1 hold with respect to protocol Π. Let f(Π) denote
the protocol derived from Π as specified in Theorem 2. Then the transformed protocol f(Π) is secure in
ASICS model Z = (M,Q′′, F ′), where Q′′ = Q′ ∪ {npkregister}, if H is modelled as a random oracle.
Applying Corollary 1 to a concrete DH-type ASICS protocol that satisfies all the preconditions, we obtain
a protocol that is secure in an ASICS model in which (a) sessions (including the test session) may use a
certificate for the peer that resulted from an npkregister query, and (b) the certificate of the test session’s
peer was not the result of a pkregister query.
4 Applications
To illustrate the power of our generic approach, we examine in Section 4.1 how to apply our technique to
Ustaoglu’s CMQV protocol [44]. CMQV is a modern DH-type protocol that is comparable in efficiency to
HMQV, but enjoys a simpler security proof in the eCK model.
Our results allow us to analyse CMQV in a model that does not include session-key, pkregister, and
npkregister queries, which simplifies the overall proof. We verify that CMQV meets the preconditions of
Corollary 1, and conclude that a variant of CMQV with group membership test on the peer’s public key
is ASICS-secure in an eCK-like model. Similarly, our generic approach can be applied to other DH-type
candidates such as NAXOS [29] and UP [45]. We discuss in Section 4.2 where the preconditions of
Corollary 1 are violated for protocols from Section 2.3 such as MQV or HMQV.
4.1 CMQV
CMQV [44] was originally proven secure in the eCK model, where there is only one public key per identifier.
In the ASICS setting, there is no such unique mapping between user identifiers and public keys. Hence, to
be able to prove CMQV secure in the ASICS model, we need to include the public keys of the users in the
session string to ensure that they have the same view of these keys when deriving the session key.
CMQV as a DH-type ASICS protocol. Two-pass CMQV can be stated as a DH-type ASICS protocol, by
instantiating Definition 9 with the following functions. Let H1 : {0, 1}k × Z∗q → Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq,
and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k be hash functions. We define fI , fR, FI , FR as:
fI(r, a, C,C ′) = H1(r, a)
FI(x, a, Y, C,C ′) =
{
⊥ , if Y 6∈ G \ {1}
((Y Be)x+da ‖ gx ‖ Y ‖ C.id ‖ A ‖ C ′.id ‖ B) , if Y ∈ G \ {1}
fR(r, b, C ′, C) = H1(r, b)
FR(y, b,X,C ′, C) =
{
⊥ , if X 6∈ G \ {1}
((XAd)y+eb ‖ X ‖ gy ‖ C.id ‖ A ‖ C ′.id ‖ B) , if X ∈ G \ {1},
where d = H2(X ‖ C.id ‖ C ′.id), e = H2(Y ‖ C.id ‖ C ′.id), A = C.pk, B = C ′.pk; ‖ denotes tagged
concatenation to avoid ambiguity with variable-length strings.
We now show, using Corollary 1, that the resulting DH-type CMQV protocol is a secure ASICS
protocol in an ASICS model with leakage queries corresponding to the eCK model.
ASICS model for eCK-like leakage. Define the ASICS model eCK = (M2, Q, F ) for eCK-like leakage [29]
as follows. Let Q = QN ∪QS . Let F be the condition that a session s satisfies F if, for all sessions s′ such
that s′ M2-matches s, none of the following conditions hold:
– a session-key(s) query has been issued;
– if s′ exists:
• a session-key(s′) query has been issued;
• both corrupt(sacert.pk) and randomness(s) queries have been issued;
• both corrupt(s′acert.pk) and randomness(s′) queries have been issued;
– if s′ does not exist:
• both corrupt(sacert.pk) and randomness(s) queries have been issued;
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• a corrupt(spcert.pk) query has been issued.
Theorem 3. Let f(CMQV) be the DH-type ASICS protocol derived from the CMQV protocol defined
above, as specified in Theorem 2. If H1,H2 and H are modelled as random oracles, G is a group where
the gap Diffie–Hellman assumption holds and membership in G is decidable in polynomial time, then
f(CMQV) is secure in ASICS model Z = (M2,QN ∪QS ∪QR, F ′), where a session s is said to satisfy F ′
if it satisfies the freshness condition F from the eCK model and no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has
been issued.
Proof (Sketch). We can readily show that CMQV satisfies the preconditions of Corollary 1 under the
above formulation of the eCK model as an ASICS model:
1. Strong partnering. It is straightforward to see that CMQV has strong partnering in the ASICSeCK′
game (where eCK′ is derived from eCK as described in Theorem 1): since the session key in CMQV is
computed via a random oracle, the probability that two sessions derive the same session key without
using the same session string input to the random oracle is negligible.
2. cNR-eCK-security of the session string variant of CMQV. This can be shown by an adaptation of
Ustaoglu’s original proof of CMQV. In large part, the main proof can be followed. However, a few
simplifications can be made because the simulation need not answer session-key queries (so preventing
key replication attacks and simulating sessions where the public key is a challenge value are easier).
3. Hardness of the session string decision problem. It can be easily seen that this is polynomial-time
reducible to the decisional problem for Diffie–Hellman triples (U, V,W ) by noting that the first
component of the CMQV session string σ is equal to g(y+eb)(x+da) = gxygadygbexgabde; the DDH
values (U, V ) can be injected into either (X,Y ), (A, Y ), (B,X), or (A,B), with W inserted into the
corresponding part of σ, yielding a polynomial-time reduction.
Detailed proofs of each of the above claims can be found in Appendix B.
4.2 Discussion
In Section 4.1 we provided evidence that our modular approach can indeed be successfully applied to
reason about the security of prominent key exchange protocols. Here we inspect which preconditions of
Corollary 1 are violated for some commonly analyzed protocols.
Let X1 = (M1, Q, F ) be the ASICS model given by Q = QN ∪ {session-key} and F defined as follows.
We say that a session s satisfies F if it holds that neither a session-key(s) query nor a session-key(s′) query
for any session s′ that is M1-matching s have been issued. Let Y1 = (M1, Q′, F ′) be derived from X1 as
specified in Theorem 1. The UKS attacks described in Section 2.3 against the DH-type protocols MQV
and KEA caused two sessions that were not M1-matching to compute the same session key. Thus, the
first precondition of Corollary 1 is violated for these protocols as they do not have strong partnering
in the ASICSY1 experiment. The two-pass HMQV protocol without ephemeral public key validation is
insecure in ASICS model X1 when special domain parameters are used (see Section 2.3) due to the lack of
ephemeral public key validation. Hence, it is easy to see that the related protocol, that we call HMQV’,
is not cNR-X1-secure, which violates the second precondition of Corollary 1. Even though it is unclear
whether there is an attack against two-pass HMQV with DSA domain parameters without ephemeral
public key validation, the third precondition of Corollary 1 is violated for this version of the HMQV
protocol as the lack of ephemeral public key validation hinders us from using a DDH oracle to solve the
session string decisional problem for the protocol since there is no guarantee that all inputs to the DDH
oracle belong to the group G. The latter observations on HQMV lead us to the conclusion that validation
of ephemeral public keys is necessary to be able to apply Corollary 1 to the HMQV protocol, even when
the adversary is not given access to the randomness query.
Let X2 = (M2, Q, F ) be the ASICS model given by Q = QN ∪ {session-key} and F defined as follows.
We say that a session s satisfies F if it holds that neither a session-key(s) query nor a session-key(s′)
query for any session s′ that is M2-matching s have been issued. Let Y2 = (M2, Q′, F ′) be derived from
X2 as specified in Theorem 1. Note that model Y2 corresponds to the model X defined in Section 2.3
capturing the UKS attack against KEA+. The latter UKS attack described against the DH-type protocol
KEA+ caused two sessions that were not M2-matching to compute the same session key. Thus, the first
precondition of Corollary 1 is violated for KEA+ as this protocol does not have strong partnering in the
ASICSY2 experiment.
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5 Lessons learned and recommendations
As we started our systematic investigation we assumed that certification authorities would need to perform
some minimal checks on public keys to obtain secure KE protocols. Perhaps surprisingly, nearly all of the
effort can be shifted to the protocols; and modern protocols often perform sufficient checks. In particular,
our results provide formal foundations for some of the protocol-specific observations of Menezes and
Ustaoglu [34]: checking that short-term as well as long-term public keys are in the key space (i.e., in
group G for DH-type protocols) is not superfluous.
Based on these observations, and given M public keys, N users may need to perform on the order of
M ×N such checks in total, even when caching the results. Reasoning purely about the overall amount
of computation time used, one could consider moving the burden to the CAs. If the CAs only create
certificates after a successful check, the CAs would only perform on the order of M checks in total.
Depending on the deployment scenario, this might be a preferable alternative.
Similarly, CAs do not necessarily need to check uniqueness of public keys. As long as the key derivation
involves the identifiers in an appropriate way, UKS attacks such as the one on KEA can be prevented.
Even if public keys are associated with multiple identifiers, secrecy of the corresponding private key is
sufficient to enable ASICS security for the honest user.
In general, our results further justify using as much information as possible in the key derivation
function (KDF). This helps with establishing formal security proofs and it is also a prudent engineering
principle. In particular, we recommend that in settings where users may have multiple long-term public
keys, the input to the KDF should not only include the identifiers and the message transcript, but also
the specific public keys used in the session.
We hope our work can serve as a foundation for the development of a range of protocols specifically
designed to incorporate certification systems, offering different tradeoffs between efficiency and trust
assumptions of the involved parties.
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A Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof structure is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in [28]. We denote by Λ
the session key space associated to protocol Π. Since the cNR-X security of protocol pi is probabilistic
polynomial-time reducible to the hardness of the computational problem of some relation φ, there exists
an algorithm A that on input of a problem instance of the computational problem of φ and interacting
with an adversary E which has non-negligible probability η of winning the cNR-X game for pi in time τ is
able to solve the computational problem of φ with non-negligible probability h(η) and in time v(τ), for
some polynomial functions h and v.
By assumption, the session string decisional problem in the ASICSY experiment for Π is polynomial-
time reducible to the decisional problem of φ. Hence there is an algorithm W which solves the session
string decisional problem for Π in polynomial-time τ ′′ given access to a decisional oracle for φ.
Let D be an adversary winning the ASICSY experiment against protocol Π with non-negligible
probability η′ in time τ ′. Let K denote the event that D does not query H with the session string ss∗
of the test session s∗. Since Π has strong partnering in the ASICSY experiment, it holds that, with
overwhelming probability, if two sessions compute the same session key, then they must be M -matching.
Thus, if event K occurs, then D can only win the experiment with negligible probability u(k) + 1/|Λ|,
where u(k) denotes the probability that D issues a session-key query to a session s that is not M -matching
s∗ and skey = s∗key.
We next define an algorithm B which solves the gap problem of φ with non-negligible probability h′(η′)
and in time v′(τ ′), for some polynomial functions h′ and v′, using adversary D as a subroutine. B will
also run algorithm A on the problem instance of the computational problem of φ, and an algorithm that
decides, in polynomial-time τ ′′′, whether an arbitrary bitstring pk submitted for certification is an element
of G. We now define B’s responses to D’s queries for the pre-specified peer setting; the post-specified peer
case proceeds similarly. Algorithm B maintains sets of certificates Ch and Cpk as well as lists H-List and
G-List, all of which are initially empty.
1. q ∈ Q ∩ {kgen, randomness, corrupt}: B forwards the query to A and passes A’s response back to D.
2. hregister(pk, Pˆ ): B forwards the query to A and passes A’s response back to D. In case A returns a
certificate C, B adds C to the set Ch, i.e., Ch ← Ch ∪ {C}.
3. pkregister(pk, Pˆ ): B checks whether pk ∈ G and VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ . If all the checks
succeed, then B adds a certificate C to the set Cpk, i.e., Cpk ← Cpk ∪ {C}, and returns C. Else, B
returns ⊥.
4. create (s = (C, i) , r, C ′): B checks whether C ∈ Ch, a session s with counter i has not yet been created,
r ∈ {I,R}, and C ′ ∈ Ch ∪ Cpk. If one of the checks fails, then B returns ⊥. Else if C ′ ∈ Cpk, then B
answers D’s query by simulating the protocol execution itself. Else, B forwards the query to A and
passes A’s response (if any) to D.
5. send (s,M): If session s does not exist or if sstatus 6= active, then B returns ⊥. Else if spcert ∈ Cpk,
then B responds to the query by simulating the protocol execution itself. Else B forwards the query
to A and passes A’s response (if any) to D.
6. H query: To answer D’s queries to the random oracle for H, B stores entries of the form (xi, λi) with
λi ∈ Λ in the H-List. When D makes a query x to the random oracle for H, B determines the return
value for D as follows:
– If there exists an entry (xi, λi) in the H-List with xi = x, then return λi.
– Else if there exists an entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, srole, ssent, srcvd, λi) in the G-List,
for some session s that has accepted and λi ∈ Λ, such that x is the session string of session s (i.e.,
x = ss) using algorithm F , then store the entry (x, λi) in the H-List and return λi.
– Else, B chooses λ ∈R Λ, stores the entry (x, λ) in the H-List and return λ.
7. session-key(s) : To answer D’s session-key queries, B stores entries of the form (sacert.id, sacert.pk,
spcert.id, spcert.pk, srole, ssent, srcvd, λi) with λi ∈ Λ in the G-List. When D makes a session-key(s)
query to an initiator session s that has accepted, B determines the return value for D as follows:
– If there exists an entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, I, ssent, srcvd, λi) in the G-List, for
some λi ∈ Λ, then return λi.
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– Else if there exists an entry (spcert.id, spcert.pk, sacert.id, sacert.pk,R, srcvd, ssent, λi) in the G-List,
then B stores the entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, I, ssent, srcvd, λi) in the G-List and
returns λi.
– Else if there exists an entry of the form (xi, λi) in the H-List, where xi = ss using algorithm F ,
then B stores the entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, I, ssent, srcvd, λi) in the G-List and
returns λi.
– Else, B chooses λ ∈R Λ, stores the entry (sacert.id, sacert.pk, spcert.id, spcert.pk, I, ssent, srcvd, λ) in
the G-List, and returns λ.
A session-key query to a responder session that has accepted is answered similarly.
8. test-session(s∗): B selects µ ∈R Λ and returns µ to D.
9. D outputs a guess: B aborts with failure.
B can detect the complementary event Kc by checking which of the entries (xi, λi) in the H-List
has xi = ss
∗ using algorithm W . B then passes xi to A. Since the test session s∗ must be fresh, no
pkregister(s∗pcert.pk, s
∗
pcert.id) occurred in the ASICSY experiment and hence the certificate s
∗
pcert has been
output through an hregister(s∗pcert.pk, s
∗
pcert.id) query. A solves the computational problem of φ with
non-negligible probability h(η), where η = η′(1− u(k)− 1/|Λ|). B is successful by outputting A’s solution
to the instance of the computational problem of φ and solves the gap problem of φ with non-negligible
probability h(η) and in time v(τ), where τ = τ ′ + τ ′′nH(nsession-key + 1) + τ ′′′npkregister with nH , nsession-key
and npkregister denoting the number of H, session-key and pkregister queries issued by D, respectively. uunionsq
Remark 9. We cannot show that Theorem 1 holds for more complex protocols Π such as UM or HMQV-C
in arbitrary ASICS base models as the simulation of non-test sessions s of Π with spcert being the result
of a pkregister query cannot be performed in the appropriate way without the knowledge of long-term
secret keys and without violating the freshness condition.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Π be an ASICS protocol secure in model X. It is straightforward to verify the
first condition of Definition 6, that is, that M -matching sessions of protocol f(Π) compute the same
session key. This follows from the fact that M -matching sessions of protocol Π compute the same key as
protocol Π is secure in ASICS model X. We next verify that the second condition of Definition 6 holds.
Claim. If there is a PPT adversary E succeeding in the ASICSY experiment against protocol f(Π) with
non-negligible advantage in time τ ′, then we can construct a PPT adversary E′ succeeding in the ASICSX
experiment against protocol Π with non-negligible advantage in time v(τ) (for some polynomial function
v) using adversary E as a subroutine. Let L be an algorithm that decides, in polynomial-time τ ′′, whether
an arbitrary bitstring pk submitted for certification is an element of G.
Proof. Fix a PPT adversary E succeeding in the ASICSY experiment against protocol f(Π) with non-
negligible advantage. We define an algorithm E′ which succeeds in the ASICSX experiment against protocol
Π with non-negligible advantage using E as a subroutine. Algorithm E′ maintains sets of certificates
Ch, Cpk and Cnpk, all of which are initially empty, and answers E’s queries in the pre-specified peer setting
as follows.
1. q ∈ Q ∩ {kgen, randomness, corrupt, session-key}: E′ issues the same query and returns the answer to
E.
2. hregister(pk, Pˆ ): When E issues an hregister(pk, Pˆ ) query, E′ issues the same query and returns the
answer to E. In case a certificate C is returned, E′ adds C to the set Ch, i.e., Ch ← Ch ∪ {C}.
3. pkregister(pk, Pˆ ): When E issues a pkregister(pk, Pˆ ) query, E′ issues the same query and returns the
answer to E. In case a certificate C is returned, E′ adds C to the set Cpk, i.e., Cpk ← Cpk ∪ {C}.
4. npkregister(pk, Pˆ ): E′ checks whether pk /∈ G (using algorithm L) and VP outputs 1 on input pk and Pˆ .
If the checks succeed (i.e., pk /∈ G and VP(pk) = 1), then E′ returns a certificate C to E and adds C
to the set Cnpk, i.e., Cnpk ← Cnpk ∪ {C}. Otherwise, E′ returns ⊥.
5. create (s = (C, i) , r, C ′): E′ checks whether C ∈ Ch, a session s with counter i has not yet been created,
r ∈ {I,R}, and C ′ ∈ Ch ∪Cpk ∪Cnpk. If one of the checks fails, then E′ returns ⊥. Else if C ′ ∈ Ch ∪Cpk,
then E′ issues the same query and returns the answer (if any) to E. Else, E′ rejects the session
creation and sets sstatus to rejected.
6. send (s,M): If session s does not exist or if sstatus 6= active, then E′ returns ⊥. Else E′ issues the
same query and returns the response (if any) to E.
7. test-session(s): When E issues a test-session(s) query to a session s that has accepted, E′ issues the
same test-session query and returns the answer to E.
8. At the end of E’s execution, that is, after it has output its guess b′, E′ outputs b′ as well.
It follows that AdvASICSYf(Π),E(k) ≤ AdvASICSXΠ,E′ (k), and adversary E′ runs in time v(τ) with τ = τ ′+τ ′′nnpkregister,
for some polynomial function v, where nnpkregister denotes the number of npkregister queries made by E.
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Since Π is secure in ASICS model X, AdvASICSYf(Π),E(k) is bounded above by a negligible function in the
security parameter k. uunionsq
B Analysis of CMQV
Let eCK′ = (M2, Q′, F ′) be the ASICS model where Q′ = Q ∪ {pkregister} and F ′ is defined as F with
the additional requirement that no pkregister(spcert.pk, spcert.id) query has been issued.
Lemma 1. Let eCK and eCK′ be as above. CMQV has strong partnering in the ASICSeCK′ experiment
under the assumption that H is a random oracle.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Namely, suppose there exists two sessions s and s′ of CMQV that hold the same
session key but are not M2-matching. Since the session key in CMQV is derived by applying a random
oracle, except with negligible probability, the input to the random oracle in both sessions must be the same.
Since they are not M2 matching, either sacert.id 6= s′pcert.id, or sacert.pk 6= s′pcert.pk, or spcert.id 6= s′acert.id,
or spcert.pk 6= s′acert.pk, or ssent 6= s′rcvd, or srcvd 6= s′sent, or srole = s′role.
First suppose srole 6= s′role. Then either the public keys, identifiers, or transcripts of the two sessions do
not correspond. But these are all inputs to the random oracle, so except with negligible probability the
outputs of the random oracle will be different, contradicting that the two sessions hold the same session
key.
Now suppose srole = s
′
role. Except with negligible probability, two distinct honest sessions will have
srand 6= s′rand, and hence ssent 6= s′sent. But since both s and s′ think of themselves as the initiator, they
will each put their own sent ephemeral public key in the second component of the call to H, and these
values are different, so except with negligible probability the outputs of the random oracle will be different,
contradicting that the two sessions hold the same key. uunionsq
Let (G, g, q) be as in Definition 9. Let φ ⊆ (G×G)×G be the Diffie–Hellman relation on G = 〈g〉. In
particular, (ga, gb) is related under φ to gc if and only if ab ≡ c mod q.
Lemma 2. The cNR-eCK security of the variant of CMQV in which the session string is output as the
session key is polynomial-time reducible to the computational problem of the Diffie–Hellman relation φ,
under the assumption that H1 and H2 are random oracles.
The basic idea of the proof is as follows.
– If the adversary happens to figure out a long-term secret key without issuing a corrupt query (event
E), it must ask that value to a random oracle H1, and we can immediately use that value to solve the
CDH problem by having embedded one of the CDH challenge values in that public key.
– If the adversary is passive in the test session (event E ∧M) we can embed the CDH challenge values
U, V as the ephemeral public keys X and Y of the test session. The adversary’s view can be simulated
perfectly unless the adversary asks either (x˜, a) or (y˜, b) as a query for H1. But the freshness condition
prevents the adversary from finding both elements of either pair. Therefore the adversary cannot
do better than guess the session string unless it can compute σ. Here the CDH of U and V can be
extracted from σ.
– If the adversary is active in the test session (event E ∧M) we can embed the CDH challenge values in
the long-term key of the partner of the test session and the ephemeral public key of the session. As
before the simulation is perfect unless the adversary asks (x˜, a) as a query for H1. Note that, since
the adversary is active, the adversary cannot change or corrupt the secret long-term key of the peer.
This time the value of σ is similar to a signature forgery and we can apply the Forking Lemma [3, 36]
to extract the CDH of U and V .
Proof. Recall that cNR-eCK security means security in an ASICS model that omits the session-key query,
so the allowed queries are QN ∪ {corrupt, randomness}. The freshness condition remains unchanged.
Recall further that the goal of the adversary is to recovery the session string; let S be the event that
an algorithm M computes the session string. The security proof largely follows the original proof of
Ustaoglu that CMQV is eCK-secure, but can be simplified somewhat as the queries in the cNR-eCK game
are restricted compared to full eCK security.
Consider the following two complementary events:
– E. There exists a certificate C ′ (created using hregister) such that M, during its execution, queries
H1(∗, b) (where C ′.pk = gb) before issuing any corrupt(C ′.pk) query (if it issues one at all).
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– E. During its execution, for every certificate C ′ (created using hregister) for which M queries H1(∗, b)
(where C ′.pk = gb), it issued a corrupt(C ′.pk) query before the H1(∗, b) query.
Since the events are complementary, if M succeeds in computing the session string, it succeeded either
when E occurred or when E occurred.
We will see how, when each event occurs, the required polynomial-time reduction exists.
E. Suppose event E occurs and M succeeds in computing the session string.
Here, the simulator S guesses one public key pk∗ at random and assigns pk∗ ← V , where (U, V ) is the
Diffie–Hellman challenge. All other public keys are generated according to the protocol specification.
For all sessions and queries where the session actor is not using pk∗, S follows the protocol specification
exactly.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗, S responds to queries as follows:
– hregister(pk∗, Pˆ ): S outputs a certificate as normal.
– corrupt(pk∗): S aborts.
– randomness(s = (C, i)) where C.pk = pk∗: Return srand.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗ and is the initiator, S responds to queries as follows:
– create(s = (C, i), I, C ′) where C.pk = pk∗: S selects x ∈R Zq, computes X ← gx, and responds with
X. Note that srand is not used in the calculation.
– send(s = (C, i),M) where sacert.pk = pk
∗ and srole = I: S does not need to simulate anything here,
since there is not outgoing message required, and since the only variable updated is the session string
ss but no session-key reveal query is allowed.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗ and is the responder, S responds to queries as follows:
– create(s = (C, i),R, C ′) where C.pk = pk∗: no response required.
– send(s = (C, i),M) where sacert.pk = pk
∗ and srole = R: S selects y ∈R Zq, computes Y ← gy, and
responds with Y . Note that srand is not used in the calculation.
S responds to H2 queries as normal. S responds to H1(∗, b) queries as normal for all b such that gb 6= pk∗.
When M queries H1(∗, b) where gb = pk∗ = V , S outputs the solution to the Diffie–Hellman challenge
(U, V ) as U b.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect up until an abort event from the corrupt query occurs. Given that
event E occurs, there exists some public key pk = gb for which the query H1(∗, b) occurs before any
corrupt(pk) query occurs. With probability at least 1/nkgen, where nkgen is the number of kgen queries
made by M, S this condition holds for pk∗. When S guesses correctly, M will indeed query H1(∗, b)
before any corrupt(pk∗) query, and thus S will solve the computational Diffie–Hellman problem.
Thus, when event E occurs, there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary for
the session string variant of CMQV to the computational Diffie–Hellman problem under the assumption
that H1 is a random oracle, with a tightness factor of nkgen.
E. We divide this event into two complementary cases:
– M . The session s for which the adversary output the session string has an M2-matching session s′.
– M . The session s for which the adversary output the session string does not have an M2-matching
session.
When E occurs, either M or M must also occur.
E ∧M . Suppose event E occurs and there is an M2-matching session s′ for the target session s.
Here, the simulator guesses two sessions s and s′; assume without loss of generality that srole = I and
s′role = R. S responds to all kgen, hregister, corrupt, and randomness queries as specified by the protocol.
For all sessions other than s and s′, S responds to create and send as specified by the protocol. For s and
s′, S responds to create and send as follows:
– create(s = (C, i), I, C ′): Return X ← U , where (U, V ) is the Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that srand
is not used.
– create(s′ = (C ′, i),R, C): No response required.
– send(s′,M): Return Y ← V , where (U, V ) is the Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that s′rand is not used.
S responds to H2 queries as normal. S responds to H1 queries as normal except for the queries (x˜, a) or
(y˜, b), where a and b are the secret keys corresponding to the public keys in sessions s and s′; when this
occurs, the simulation aborts.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect unless a H1(x˜, a) or H1(y˜, b) query occurs. Because of event E, M
issues a corrupt(ga) query before any H1(x˜, a) query, and a corrupt(gb) query before any H1(y˜, b) query.
Since x˜ and y˜ are used in only one session and H1 is a random function, no information can be learned
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about x˜ and y˜ without randomness(s) or randomness(s′) queries. By the freshness condition, it cannot be
that both randomness(s) and corrupt(ga) occurred, or that both randomness(s′) and corrupt(gb) occurred.
Thus, if S correctly guess s and s′, the simulation is perfect and does not abort. This happens with
probability at least 2/n2create.
Assuming the simulation is perfect and does not abort, and that M outputs the session string, S can
use this to solve the Diffie–Hellman problem. In particular, let σ be the shared secret in the session string
output by M. Then S outputs σg−abedU−beV −ad as the solution to the computational Diffie–Hellman
challenge (U, V ).
Thus, when event E ∧M occurs, there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary
for the session string variant of CMQV to the computational Diffie–Hellman problem under the assumption
that H1 is a random oracle, with a tightness factor of n2create.
E ∧M . Suppose event E occurs but there is no M2-matching session for the target session s.
Here, the simulator guesses integers j ∈R {1, . . . , nkgen}, and a session s∗. Assume without loss of
generality that s∗role = I.
For the jth query to kgen, S assigns pk∗ ← V from the Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ) to be the
public key; for all other kgen queries it responds as specified by the protocol.
All hregister queries are responded to as normal. All corrupt queries are responded to as normal, except
for corrupt(pk∗), in which case S aborts.
Suppose that M selects s∗ as the target session and furthermore that s∗pcert.pk = V .
For all sessions and queries where the session actor or peer is not using pk∗, S follows the protocol
specification exactly.
For sessions where the session actor is using pk∗, S responds as in event E.
For sessions where the session peer is using pk∗, S responds as specified by the protocol, except for the
target session s∗. In s∗, S responds as follows:
– create(s∗, I, C ′): S returns X ← U , where (U, V ) is the Diffie–Hellman challenge. Note that s∗rand is
not used.
– send(s∗,M): No response required.
– randomness(s∗): Return s∗rand.
– session-key(s∗): S aborts. Assuming that S correctly guesses s∗ as the target session, this abort will
never occur.
S responds to H2 queries as normal. S responds to H1(x˜, b) queries as normal except for the following
two cases:
– If gb = pk∗: S outputs the solution to the Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ) as U b.
– If x˜ = s∗rand and g
a = s∗acert.pk: S aborts.
Note that S’s simulation is perfect up until an abort event from the corrupt or the H2 query occurs.
Given that s∗ is fresh and no matching session exists, no corrupt(s∗) query is allowed and hence S does
not abort for that reason. Given that event E occurs, if M queries H1(s∗rand, a) such that ga = s∗acert.pk,
M must have issued a corrupt(ga) query first. But it is also the case that s∗ is fresh, so M cannot have
also issued a randomness(s∗) query, and thus cannot know s∗rand unless it guessed it correctly, which can
be done only with negligible probability.
Assume the simulation is perfect and does not abort, and thatM outputs the session string containing
the correct shared secret σ = guygadyguvegadev. S can then compute η = σY −adV −ade = guy+uve. But
the peer’s ephemeral secret key y was chosen by the adversary, so without y S cannot directly compute
guv from η.
Using the Forking Lemma, S runsM on the same input and the same random coins but with modified
answers to H2 queries. Note that M must have queried H2(Y, s∗acert.id, s∗pcert.id) to obtain e, because
otherwise M would be unable to compute σ except with negligible probability. For the second run of M,
S responds to H2(Y, s∗acert.id, s∗pcert.id) with e′ 6= e selected uniformly at random.
If M succeeds in the second run, it outputs σ = guygad′yguve′gad′e′v. S can then compute η′ =
σ′Y −ad
′
V −ad
′e′ = guyguve
′
. S can furthermore compute
(η/η′)1/(e−e
′) = (guyguveg−uyg−uve
′
)1/(e−e
′) = guv(e−e
′)/(e−e′) = guv
which is the solution to the computational Diffie–Hellman challenge (U, V ).
Thus, when event E ∧M occurs, there exists a polynomial-time reduction from a cNR-eCK adversary
for the session string variant of CMQV to the computational Diffie–Hellman problem under the assumption
that H1 and H2 are random oracles, with a tightness factor of ncreatenkgennH2c, where c is a constant from
the Forking Lemma. uunionsq
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Remark 10. Because in the above lemma we do not have to prove full session key indistinguishability
security of CMQV, instead proving the hardness of session string computation of a variant of CMQV, we
can make a few simplifications from Ustaoglu’s original proof:
– We do not have to worry about key replication attacks (when the adversary causes two non-matching
sessions to have the same session key (that is, session string), and then reveals the session key at one
of the sessions) because there is no session-key query.
– In event E, we do not have to worry about setting the session string correctly for any session involving
the user whose public key has been injected with the CDH challenge, because there is no session-key
query. Thus we do not need a DDH oracle here.
– In event E ∧M , we do not have to use the DDH oracle to test which of the many H random oracle
queries is the solution we need: we simply output the CDH value derived directly from the output of
M.
Lemma 3. The session string decision problem for CMQV is polynomial-time reducible to the decisional
problem of the Diffie–Hellman relation φ.
Proof. LetD be a polynomial-time algorithm that can distinguish real CMQV session strings (g(y+eb)(x+da) ‖
X ‖ Y ‖ id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ B) from random session strings (gr ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ gb), for
randomly chosen a, b, x, y, r ∈R Zq, id and id′ are arbitrary binary strings, d = H2(gx ‖ id ‖ id′), and
e = H2(gy ‖ id ‖ id′).
We claim that there exists an algorithm E that can distinguish real Diffie–Hellman triples (gu, gv, guv)
from random triples (gu, gv, gw) for randomly chosen u, v, w ∈R Zq.
First, note that g(y+eb)(x+da) = gxy+ady+bex+abde. Using D construct ED as follows. Let (U, V,W ) be
a Diffie–Hellman challenge. Pick arbitrary id, id′. Do one of the following, each with equal probability:
1. Set A← U and B ← V . Choose x, y ∈R Zq.
Run D on the session string (gxyAdyBexW de ‖ gx ‖ gy ‖ id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ B).
2. Set A← U and Y ← V . Choose x, b ∈R Zq.
Run D on the session string (Y xW dgbexAbde ‖ gx ‖ Y ‖ id ‖ A ‖ id′ ‖ gb).
3. Set X ← U and B ← V . Choose a, y ∈R Zq.
Run D on the session string (XygadyW eBade ‖ X ‖ gy ‖ id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ B).
4. Set X ← U and Y ← V . Choose a, b ∈R Zq.
Run D on the session string (WY adXbegabde ‖ X ‖ Y ‖ id ‖ ga ‖ id′ ‖ gb).
E outputs the result of D.
Note that in each of the above cases, if (U, V,W ) is a real Diffie–Hellman triple, then D is run on a real
CMQV session string, whereas if (U, V,W ) is a random triple, then D is run on a random session string.
Thus, if D is a distinguisher for CMQV session strings, then E is a distinguisher for the Diffie–Hellman
relation. uunionsq
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